Can t We All Just Get Along NGOs IGOs and the Military in Effective Humanitarian Relief
Introduction The modern military has increasingly become an important factor in what has been termed peacekeeping operations. These depart from what the military has traditionally been trained for. This difference is between making peace and keeping the peace; two bifurcating missions that often create many tensions, and bringing the military into direct contact with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) performing humanitarian operations. In addition, these NGOs have multiplied exponentially within the last decade. In 1989, 48 international NGOs were registered with the UN. ... An added complexity also brings international organizations (IGOs) into the field as well. This triangle of institutions all working towards the same goal has traditionally created conflict between the three. This tension was highlighted in the failure of humanitarian relief in Somalia and Rwanda. ... In this instance, the UN, various NGOs, and the military all managed to coexist in a relationship that was mutually beneficial. Tensions in Working Relationships The relationship that must exist between NGOs, IGOs, and the military has only recently become an issue for study in the post-Cold War focus on intrastate conflicts. However, the growing, haphazard, integration that has occurred between the military and civilian relief agencies has brought many tensions to the forefront. ... One of the most daunting challenges to overcome for an advocate of positive humanitarian cooperation is over the issue of neutrality. It is a dominant tension because it is at the core of how most NGOs define themselves. In direct contrast, the military can never be seen as a neutral organization, making military intervention seen as a direct contradiction to the values of the NGO. Some humanitarian organizations argue that neutrality is necessary since they are concerned with “protecting people and ensuring basic human rights and the security of the victims on all sides of a conflict” (Winslow 2000, 225). In contrast, the military, as well as the UN and other international bodies who intervene in a conflict, might use force “directed just against one party” (225). ... Fortunately, the definition of the concept of neutrality is already in a state of flux and revision by many NGOs, though not to the point of lessening the gap perceived to exist between the humanitarian organizations and the military. ... Another argument for the continued neutrality of humanitarian organizations is that the “protected status of UN and NGO staff under Geneva law…depends on the neutrality of their organizations” (Stockton 2002, 2). ... What then becomes dominant for the relief workers is security. Major constraints to relief by NGOs are the “threats to the security of field staff posed by their non-neutral status” (Stockton 2002, 1). Therefore, since neutrality is becoming less and less possible for humanitarian agencies, effective security becomes imperative. ... “There is a general presumption that the armed protection of aid workers and their facilities is undesirable because it makes humanitarian work more difficult and dangerous, signaling that the humanitarian effort has taken sides” (Pugh 2000, 235-36). However, both NGOs and the military have increasingly understood that where the consent of the parties is tentative, partial, or non-existent, security becomes imperative, and can only be provided by a military force. Following their model of active humanitarianism, Lindenberg and Bryant (2001, 92) write that CARE, after revising their policies and guidelines, now recognize that “when necessary, it will advocate that the UN system help provide safe access through humanitarian corridors.” Once the military is involved, though, casualties become much more likely. ... If it is not, then the military should not be used as an instrument of national power in that situation” (Seiple 1999, 66). ... The effectiveness of the military is demolished when our enemies realize that they can change American foreign policy by killing our soldiers. It also places these soldiers at a greater risk any time they are deployed as a security force to a humanitarian operation, in addition to the relief workers they are attempting to protect. ... “The culture of the military is unique. The functional imperatives of war and military operations ensure that the Services stand apart from civilian society” (Dandeker and Gow 1999, 60). In simplistic terms, soldiers are trained to be “takers of life,” while many relief organizations perceive themselves as the “savers of lives” (74). A paradox has emerged in the views of relief agencies as they have had to align their own goals with those of the military in peacekeeping operations. Laura Miller (1997, 24-26) wrote that while “relief workers have become pro-military intervention, [they have] remained essentially anti-military. These workers have experienced the need for armed intervention in their regions, and have seen the concrete benefits of military deployments. ... ” NGOs view the military as a necessary evil, but one in which, if possible, would do without. Under these conditions, even when working together, there is a feeling of non-cooperation that jeopardizes the success of humanitarian operations. In addition to the differences in their basic goals, the military and humanitarian NGOs differ in many other fundamental areas as well. All of these contribute to the tensions present between the institutions. NGOs search for non-violent solutions while the military advocates a controlled use of violence. Their ideals differ between a global, internationalist ideal held by the NGOs, while militaries are strongly nationalistic. ... Humanitarian NGOs tend to be highly decentralized, while the military functions hierarchically (Winslow 2000, 224). This last point, as will be shown, can be utilized as a tool in a successful working relationship between NGOs and the military. The tensions highlighted above make NGOs very hesitant to seek assistance from the military or international organizations. In Kosovo, where there was general cooperation between NGOs and the military, coordinated by the UN, the operation was seen as a success. However, the lead agency, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was not willing to work with the military at first. It was only after “Albania had called for NATO aid to refugees and Macedonia insisted that refugees on its border be housed in military-built camps as a condition for granting them temporary asylum, that UNHCR accepted assistance” (UNHCR 2000, paras. ... In the emerging, tension-filled, relationship that now exists, how can the divergent goals within the triangle of NGOs, IGOs, and the military be successfully integrated to achieve positive humanitarian response? Successful humanitarian operations have become increasingly difficult to achieve in the complexity of modern intrastate conflicts. This paper will attempt to demonstrate that what is needed is cooperation and a strong working relationship between NGOs, IGOs, and the military. ... However, these difficulties are outweighed by the possibilities that exist in a humanitarian relief partnership. Cooperation between these institutions needs to be done on a more supportive basis with equal sharing of information in order to have increased effectiveness in humanitarian operations in modern conflicts. Successful humanitarian relief in modern society can only be achieved once a positive and proactive working relationship between NGOs, IGOs and the military is realized. ... Once these are recognized, by analyzing the failures in Somalia and Rwanda, a model for future success in humanitarian relief efforts can be established. Chris Seiple (1999) points out three attributes from both the military and NGOs that can be beneficial to one another. As discussed above, the most obvious benefit from the military is security, which humanitarian agencies have begun to accept, if grudgingly. The military also brings an effective infrastructure into a complex situation, allowing for improved planning and communication abilities, as well as stronger and quicker implementation. ... Also due to this, the military’s logistical capabilities far outmatch those of the relief agencies. NGOs also have important contributions that must be accessed. They bring professional humanitarian expertise, due to their extensive time studying the complex problems presented by conflicts. NGOs are also generally much more familiar with the region as they have usually been there much longer than the military. Finally, along with this time, NGOs represent a sustained commitment to the problem.