Term papers on Kennedy's Inaugural Address and Globalization Essays on Kennedy's Inaugural Address and Globalization Research papers on Kennedy's Inaugural Address and Globalization Student papers on Kennedy's Inaugural Address and Globalization Book reports on Kennedy's Inaugural Address and Globalization Dissertation / Thesis on Kennedy's Inaugural Address and Globalization Articles written on Kennedy's Inaugural Address and Globalizationthe Washington, DC chapter met on Tuesday, 16 Dec, 1930-2130, at Bertucci's in Arlington to continue the discussion of how to achieve U.S. objectives vis-a-vis "rogue" states begun a month or so ago by the Oxford chapter with its consideration of North Korea. Here is a summary of our discussion: 1. Generally speaking, what are the U.S. objectives for "rogue" states? Without first pinpointing exactly what a "rogue" state is (and instead accepting that we have a "feel" for what these states are), we generally categorized our primary objective in dealing with these states is to bring the perceived threat to our nation's security to an acceptable level; a secondary objective is to create a more favorable environment for human rights within a targeted state. In broad terms, the national security objective was viewed as having been given more weight within the United States. 2. How do we characterize past strategies for achieving these objectives? The preferred United States' Cold War strategy for dealing with "rogue" states was containment, a by-product of the bipolar security environment. While economic and diplomatic tools to enact containment appear on the surface to have been exclusively employed, a closer historical review shows that limited military action has also been used (e.g. Libya) -- and not necessarily to merely contain these states but to attempt to enact regime change (e.g. Cuba). The inter-war strategy (between the Cold War and the Global War on Terror), as exemplified largely by former President Clinton shifted away from a strategy of containment through diplomatic isolation toward one of diplomatic engagement (e.g. North Korea), with two notable exceptions -- Bosnia-I-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic. The Global War on Terror strategy under President Bush appeared to because X or Y," and the indeterminate nature of the future common enemy caused some to question whether either or both of the parties, Europe and the United States, were likely to make the short term compromises perhaps necessary to strengthen the relationship for this vague future contingency.
To link to this page, copy the following code to your site:
All Papers Are For Research And Reference Purposes Only!
You may not turn these papers in as your own! You must cite our web site as your source!
