What is akrasia Why is it a problem How does Aristotle solve the problem
... This essay illustrates the problems that Aristotle attempts to deal with when addressing akrasia. In his definition of akrasia that he illustrates in book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics there are some flaws and ambiguities that need to be addressed and these are assessed. It will be shown that Aristotle does little to solve the ‘Socratic Paradox’ that he allegedly sets out to solve. Whether it is actually possible to be akratic will be considered, concluding that although Aristotle makes interesting and comprehendible reasons for asserting how akrasia is caused, further criteria need to be added to make the account less problematic. ... Essay: Akrasia does not translate well from original English, but most translators of the works of Aristotle choose to use the term ‘incontinence’. ... Carrier, however, feels that many philosophers have “unduly narrowed their focus” when looking at akrasia and that it would be better to describe it as ‘perversity’ (Carrier, 1976; 229). ... It is argued that a man cannot be both wise and incontinent at the same time and through passion, he does what he knows to be wrong (Kenny, 1966; 164). In order to describe fully what is meant by akrasia, it is useful to look at examples of akratic behaviour. Aristotle uses several examples, including; “The incontinent person illustrates the proverb ‘if water chokes us what do we use to wash it down? ... Aristotle describes the akratic as someone who “Knows that his actions are base, but does them because of his feelings, whereas a continent person knows that his appetites are base, but because of reason does not follow them” (1145b 13-15). An interesting philosophical discussion is whether akrasia actually exists. The Socratic view denies that it does exist and someone who acts against their better judgement does so through ignorance and therefore did not know any better. Akrasia suggests that the agent does know better but willingly follows the worse course of action. It appears to be unclear whether Aristotle fully believes that someone can willingly choose the worse course of action. Anthony Kenny claims that Aristotle provides the case “in which the agent has actual knowledge of the wrongness of the particular act that he does” (Kenny, 1966; 163). Kenny claims that those who oppose that Aristotle actually accepts the notion of akrasia are misunderstanding the text (Kenny, 1996; 163). Writers such as David Wiggins feel that more needs to be added to the Aristotelian account of akrasia to fully explain how someone can voluntarily act against their better judgement (Wiggins, 1980). There are some that fully deny that Aristotle is accepting that there is such a thing as akrasia, however as Peijnenburg points out, why would Aristotle go to such a lengthy discussion about akrasia if only to concede that Socrates was right all along?