Egyptain Use of Combined Arms During the Arab Israeli war
Combined Arms Essay “We know well what happens when a single arm is opposed to two others.” Carl von Clausewitz The planning and employment of the Egyptian forces during the opening days of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 is a model example of the effectiveness of coupling the principles of combined arms into a complimentary relationship with respect to the fundamentals of maneuver warfare. The outcome of first three days of the war proved the validity of the Egyptians detailed planning integrating the elements of maneuver warfare, combined arms, and warfighting functions. This integration of operational planning considerations created a package that overwhelmed and stunned the Israeli forces along the Bar Lev Line. So severe were the initial impacts of the coordinated Egyptian attacks that the Israeli forces would days later have no choice but to reevaluate and modify their tactics in hopes of repelling the Egyptian advances. The Egyptian battle plan will be contrasted as to how the application of combined arms principles and maneuver warfare contributed to the initial success of the Egyptian Army over the Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula. Additionally, correlations will be drawn between how Egyptian planning and execution parallels current Marine Corps combined arms doctrine. As noted in MCDP-1, Warfighting, “complementary combined arms seek to take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different types of units and to enhance mobility and firepower in support of military operations.